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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 005014

SIPDIS

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TAGS: [KNNP](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [MNUC](#) [TRGY](#) [IR](#) [TU](#)

SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN - TURKEY TO SPEAK OUT AT UNGA, BUT FEARS  
UNSC REFERRAL BEFORE GROUND IS PREPARED

REF: FBIS IAP20040901000098

Classified By: PolMil Counselor Timothy A. Betts. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: Turkish FM Gul is expected to voice Turkey's concerns about Iran's nuclear program at the UNGA, but MFA worries that referring Iran's case to the Security Council before the outcome there is assured might actually accelerate Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. End summary.

2. (C) The Tehran Times reported on Sept. 1 that Turkish Ambassador to Iran Halit Bozkurt Aran had told a member of the Majlis that Turkey supported Iran's right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy (ref). This was replayed in the Turkish press on Sept. 3. During a Sept. 3 meeting on another subject, Polmilcouns and EXBS Advisor raised these reports with MFA Deputy Director General for Disarmament and Arms Control Haluk Ilıcak.

3. (C) Ilıcak had not seen Ambassador Aran's reported remarks. He confirmed that part of Turkey's position is that Art. 6 of the NPT does give Iran the right to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes, but Turkey has real concerns about Iran's nuclear program, he emphasized. Reading from talking points prepared for Foreign Minister Gul's use at the UNGA, Ilıcak said Gul would urge Iran to uphold its responsibilities under the NPT and the additional protocol. Gul would also note how Iran's concealing of its violations of the NPT and its commitments to the EU-3 over the centrifuge had increased Turkey's concern. Gul would also praise Russia for its position not to supply fuel to the Bushehr plant until the subsequent return of that fuel is assured. Ilıcak was confident that Ambassador Aran understood the policy since he had been in Ankara the week of August 23 and had discussed it in a meeting with Gul and Ilıcak. He presumed that the ambassador's remarks were taken out of context.

4. (C) Regarding the IAEA's upcoming meeting, Ilıcak said he had read the report on Iran. He thought the IAEA concerns were serious, but he had doubts about whether now was the time for the IAEA Board of Governors to refer the matter to the UN Security Council. If the UNSC refused to take action, then the IAEA's inspections would most likely cease. Iran would have no incentive to cooperate and would proceed unencumbered by inspectors. Ilıcak thought that eventually the case would need to be referred to the UNSC, but before that happens, the ground must first be laid within the Council to ensure the proper outcome. While he did not believe that this groundwork had been done now, he hoped it would in be in the near future because "once Iran has the bomb, it will be too late."

EDELMAN